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vette, with fourteen hundred troops and ample supplies, reached Java in safety. A similar one of equal or greater strength destined for the Ile de France was destroyed by the British about the same time. Six months later the British seized Java ; but this fact does not disprove Napoleon's care or concern.

The central truth then is clear : that Napoleon did have a colonial policy comparable to the other great plans which he formed, that he put forth every exertion to carry it out, studying his problems, sparing neither time nor expense in solving them, and generally being deeply concerned to his latest hour with the inter-relations of world politics. It would indeed have been strange if a mind suckled on Raynal's *Two Indies* had belied its earliest manifestations of character and had been false to its whole training.

What then were the causes of Napoleon's colonial failure? The incapacity of Decrès, the minister of naval affairs, and of the naval administration generally, as the supporters of the Napoleonic legend declare? Certainly not ; mediocre as those men may have been the imperial spirit permeated naval administration as it permeated every other department of government. Dr. Roloff, we think, finds the true causes : first, in the necessary weakness of French sea-power due to intervals of peace so short that a navy could not be organized and built ; secondly, in the fact that European interests were more vital than colonial interests after all and that they must have Napoleon's main attention even though at times he jeopardized them for the sake of colonial empire.

We have already noted one grave fault in the discussion of a very important question : it seems ungracious to complain where so much is excellent. But we remark in closing that the authorities given, not as foot-notes, for the taste of readers in Germany as well as here is in revolt against them, but in the appendix, leave something to be desired. Doubtless the author's note-book would confirm every bald reference of "X to Y," date so and so, but in the use of unprinted sources where specific references are made at all the reader may fairly claim a few words of the original. These Dr. Roloff does not give ; yet he finds space for eleven pages of text, printing *in extenso* the instructions of the First Consul to Leclerc, a paper the contents of which at least were well known, even though the context was not. This we are glad he has done, but the other he might not have left undone. The writer's style is somewhat jejune but he avoids in the main those labyrinthine involutions which repel foreigners from the reading of German books. The idea of the essay is commendable ; so, too, on the whole, is the execution.

Preliminary Stages of the Peace of Amiens. By H. M. BOWMAN.
[University of Toronto Studies, History, Second Series, Vol. I., pp. 77-155.] (Toronto. The University Library. 1899. Pp. 79.)

MR. BOWMAN's dissertation is a good piece of work. It has endured the criticism of two famous universities, Leipsic and Toronto, and has

been accepted by them as admitting the writer to the guild of historians. It seems needless therefore to say that the materials of his work have been diligently collected from many sources, some of them archival and unpublished, and that he has mastered all of them thoroughly. The course of events and the consequent diplomacy which led up to the peace of Amiens will probably not be better outlined than in these pages until our knowledge is vastly expanded, and of that there is no immediate probability. Two characteristics of the pamphlet seem noteworthy: first, the confirmatory details drawn by the writer from unprinted material in the London Record Office; second, the rather startling confession of his concluding remarks, that it was Great Britain which deliberately broke the peace of Amiens and brought on the Napoleonic wars. Of the former the probable course of negotiations between Great Britain and Austria in 1800 (p. 46) is highly interesting, as indeed are some others. If the latter conclusion had been earlier accepted by the Tory historians of England, pounds of printers' ink and paper would have been saved for other than controversial purposes. Mr. Bowman clearly struggles to hold an even scale and keep himself open to conviction. Justification by the plea of necessity is, however, not always the refuge of ripe scholarship: it certainly does not close the debate. Trafalgar, Leipsic and Waterloo settled many things, but the question of moral responsibility was not among them.

We note one tendency which we consider dangerous. Known writers distinguished for logical exactness may sometimes state conclusions as facts; even they should be very chary in this practice, and others should not indulge in it at all. For example, and this is only one of many that might be quoted, it is a matter of opinion pure and simple what Bonaparte's relations were to the day of Fructidor (p. 14), and this should be stated. As to the perennial question of the invasion of England (p. 17) the reference is utterly misleading, for that was a notorious instance of the ever-recurring use by any and all French governments of such a menace in order to wring money from the public. The First Consul's direct appeal to George III. is represented on page 24 as a breach of English constitutional practice: we fancy the French executive was perfectly clear in his mind that the King of Great Britain ruled as well as reigned. Possibly our caution is not needed, for Mr. Bowman's readers will in the main be the wary ones of his own profession.

Henry Knox. A Soldier of the Revolution. By NOAH BROOKS.
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1900. Pp. xvi, 286.)

It is not often that an historical writer of to-day finds so unworked a mine of interesting and valuable biographical matter as Mr. Brooks has exploited in his life of Henry Knox, or one in which the veins of information are so easily accessible. A brief and rare sketch by Francis S. Drake, prepared for the "Memorials for the Massachusetts Society of the Cincinnati," has been hitherto the only, and a very unsatisfactory, memoir